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EUREKA! CALIFORNIA STRIKES GOLD
WITH THE CLAIM OF RIGHT DOCTRINE IN
ACKERMAN V. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD'
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine getting a sizeable end-of-the-year bonus from your
employer. You received the check in December, which means that
the money is taxable income for that year. Now imagine learning
that part or all of the bonus was the unfortunate result of an
accounting error, and you have to pay the money back in January.
Under both federal and California tax law, you must still report the
bonus as income in the year of receipt, even if you later pay the
money back.2 This is commonly known as the "claim of right
doctrine," which views any income a taxpayer receives as reportable
income if, at the time of receipt, the taxpayer has taken the money
under a "claim of right and without restriction as to its dis-
position..."3
Ordinarily, the taxpayer's remedy is simple. Under both the
federal statutory scheme and California's common law scheme, the
taxpayer can deduct the money repaid from the taxable income in the
year of repayment.4 The result, generally, is a reduction in the tax
liability for the repayment year, which offsets the taxes paid on the
income in the year of receipt.
5
1. No. BC 296334 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2004), aff'd, No. B 178750
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
2. Both federal and California tax schemes have claim of right provisions.
The federal provision is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004) (originally
enacted 1954). California's approach, as held in Ackerman, follows the
common law approach found in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet,
286 U.S. 417 (1932).
3. N. Am. Oil, 286 U.S. at 424.
4. See infra Part III.
5. A significant flaw of the common law scheme is that even where the
amount deducted offsets the tax liability in the repayment year, it does not
account for the change in the taxpayer's status from one year to the next. See
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But what if you make less money in the year you repay that
bonus than the amount of the bonus itself? What if you become
unemployed? What if you are a small business owner and the
income you received was a payment on a large contract that was
subsequently cancelled? What if your business income in the
repayment year is less than what you paid back?
These are not extreme or improbable situations in which a
taxpayer might find herself. Under the federal claim of right scheme,
the taxpayer may take advantage of an alternative calculation method
that allows the taxpayer to re-open the previous years and recalculate
the taxes owed based on the repayment. 6  Under California's
common law scheme, however, a taxpayer is limited to deducting the
amount repaid against her tax liability for the repayment year,
however small that tax liability may be.7 If the repayment amount
exceeds the taxable income, the taxpayer can recover only the
amount of taxes owed on the taxable income for the repayment year.
8
Now imagine you take a new job in a different state in the
repayment year. You have sufficient federal income so that the
repayment deduction creates an offset for the taxes paid in the prior
years. You, however, have little or no California source income for
the repayment year. Under the California scheme, you may only use
the deduction method.9 The result is obvious: using the deduction
method against de minimis or non-existent California source income
produces the same effect as if you had earned nothing in the
repayment year, and you virtually forfeit the taxes paid on that bonus
to the State of California.
infra note 45 and accompanying text.
6. Section 1341 allows for a traditional deduction method that is
analogous to the common-law approach through subdivision (a)(4), but also
allows taxpayers to recalculate their tax liability for the years in which income
was received under subdivision (a)(5). See infra notes 42-48 and
accompanying text.
7. The California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) argued, and the court
agreed, that under the California Revenue & Taxation Code there is no analog
to § 1341 of the I.R.C. As a result, California applies the common law-which
is controlled by North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417
(1932). See infra notes 30-48 and accompanying text (discussing the common
law claim of right doctrine).
8. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
9. As was argued by the FTB and decided by Ackerman. See Ackerman v.
Franchise Tax Bd., No. BC 296334 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2004).
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This unforgiving common law approach to the claim of right
doctrine was precisely the issue in Ackerman v. Franchise Tax
Board. The taxpayer argued that California had adopted the federal
claim of right scheme when the California legislature enacted the
Conformity Act of 1983, through which the state substantially
conformed its tax code to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).' ° The
court, however, held that California continues to follow the common
law approach and further held that this approach was constitutionally
sound.
This Comment argues that California has, in fact, incorporated
I.R.C. § 1341 as asserted in Ackerman12 and, alternatively, re-
considers the constitutionality of the common law doctrine. Part II
summarizes the facts of Ackerman. Part III traces the history of the
claim of right doctrine in federal jurisprudence-from its common
law origins through the enactment of § 1341-and also examines the
doctrine's development in California. Part IV analyzes the trial
court's holding and argues that through the Conformity Act of 1983,
California substantially harmonized the Revenue and Taxation Code
with the I.R.C. such that § 1341 has been incorporated by reference.
Finally, Part V examines the constitutionality of the common law
claim of right doctrine "as applied" when the taxpayer's residence
changes between the year of receipt and the year of repayment.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Peter Ackerman' 3 earned a substantial amount of capital gains
10. Id. at 11-12.
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Peter Ackerman's background is summarized as follows:
Peter Ackerman is managing director of RockportCapital Inc., a
private investment firm based in London and Washington D.C. Until
1990 Ackerman was director of capital markets at Drexel Burnham
Lambert. In 1990 he was a visiting scholar at the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies in London where he completed Strategic
Nonviolent Conflict-The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth
Century, published January 1994. In addition to being a member of the
Cato Institute's Board of Directors, Ackerman is chairman of the
Board of Overseers of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and
serves on the boards of CARE, Colgate University, and the Albert
Einstein Institution. He is also an adviser to the Harvard Center for
International Affairs. Ackerman holds a doctorate from the Fletcher
December 2005] 2277
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income during the tax years between 1986 and 1991.14 During those
years, Ackerman was a California resident and reported this income
on both federal and California income tax returns.'
5
In 1992, Ackerman was sued by investors and entered into a
settlement agreement whereby he repaid the investors
$59,999,997.00 in 1992 and $17,000,000.00 in 1993.16 In a Closing
Agreement, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) allowed Ackerman
to treat the settlement payments as capital loss and deduct the
amount against his capital gains in the repayment year. 17 Ackerman
moved out of California in 1992 and had de minimis California
source income in 1992 and 1993.18 Originally, Ackerman did not
attempt to deduct the settlement payments against his California
source income in 1992 and 1993, but in 1997 he filed amended
returns for both tax years, seeking refunds totaling just under five
million dollars.19
The California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) claimed that it never
received the 1992 amended return and thus never acted upon it.
2 °
The FTB, however, did act on the 1993 amended return, formally
denying that claim in writing on October 23, 2001 .21 Ackerman
brought suit against the FTB in superior court in 2003. During a
four day trial, Ackerman argued that the FTB improperly denied his
refund because it wrongly disallowed the income calculations to be
carried over from his federal returns.23 Ackerman argued that § 1341
had been "incorporated by reference" into California's Revenue and
School of Law and Diplomacy.
Cato Institute, Project Advisory Board, at http://www.socialsecurity.org/
about/board.html.
14. Ackerman, No. BC 296334, at 2. The amount of Ackerman's capital
gains was not noted in the decision; however, the amount repaid to investors
approximated $77,000,000.00. Id. While the opinion does not explicitly state
this, it seems from the discussion that the calculation method used on
Ackerman's 1992 and 1993 federal tax returns derived from § 1341(a)(5). See
id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id. at 2-3.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 1.
23. Id. at 11.
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Taxation Code through the 1983 Conformity Act and pointed to the
express incorporation of I.R.C. § 67 (which cross references § 1341
substantially) into Revenue and Taxation Code § 17076. Ackerman
further argued that "[u]nder such a construction... the Tax Board's
denial ... was improper."24 Alternatively, Ackerman argued that
California's common law approach violates the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution 25 because it
discriminates against non-resident taxpayers.
26
Conversely, the FTB "maintain[ed] that there is no analog to
I.R.C. § 1341 in the Rev. and Tax. Code," and that even if such an
incorporation by reference existed, it would be limited in application
to § 1341(a)(4) since Revenue and Taxation Code § 17024.5 spe-
cifically prohibits "applying Federal Tax Credits on California
returns. '" 2 The FTB further requested that the court take judicial
notice of pending legislation indicating that the Revenue and
Taxation Code had not incorporated § 1341.28 Finding no California
authority supporting Ackerman's position on incorporation, the court
ruled in favor of the FTB and held that Mr. Ackerman could not
recover the taxes paid on income he repaid in full.
29
III. THE CLAIM OF RIGHT DOCTRINE
A. Historical Background of the Federal Claim
of Right Doctrine
Legal scholars commonly attribute the origin of the claim of
right doctrine to Justice Brandeis's often quoted3 0 announcement in
24. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
26. Ackerman, No. BC 296334, at 15 (arguing that "but for his non-resident
status he would be able to fully recover his losses").
27. Id. at 11.
28. Id. at 15. Assembly Bill 3072 (AB 3072), was designed to conform the
Revenue and Taxation Code "to federal law regarding taxpayer relief within
the context of claim of right." Personal Income Tax: Claim of Right; Hearing
of Assemb. B. 3072 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Rev. & Tax, 2003-04 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2004), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/
bill/asm/ab_3051-3100/ab 3073 cfa 20040721101119sen floor.html
[hereinafter Bill Analysis](enacted at Assemb. B. 3073, 2003-04 Leg., Reg.
Sess. 2 (Cal. 2004)).
29. Ackerman, No. BC 296334, at 15.
30. See Harold DuBroff, The Claim ofRight Doctrine, 40 TAX L. REv. 729,
December 2005] 2279
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North American Oil v. Burnet:
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and
without restriction as to its disposition, he has received
income which he is required to return, even though it may
still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money,
and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore
its equivalent.31
Brandeis went on to declare, "[S]hould it later appear that the
taxpayer was not entitled to keep the money... he would be entitled
to a deduction in the year of repayment." 32  Little could Justice
Brandeis know that what he intended to be no more than a practical
formula used to identify taxable income33 would become a greatly
debated subject.34
Martin Webster, summarizing the shortcomings of the common
law approach in 1955, noted:
[the] inability to adjust the earlier year obviously results in
hardship where the taxpayer's tax bracket in the year of
receipt is high and in the year of repayment low, for in such
case adjustment to the year of repayment would not
compensate the taxpayer adequately for the tax that he paid
on the same item in the year of receipt.
35
The Supreme Court was aware of this flaw when it decided Healy v.
Commissioner36 in 1953 but found it to be an "unavoidable
consequence of the annual accounting system."
37
In considering these inequities, the court concluded that:
730 (1985); Martin H. Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version,
10 TAXL. REv. 381,381 (1955).
31. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417,424 (1932).
32. United States v. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. 678, 680 (1969).
33. See C.E. Lister, The Use and Abuse of Pragmatism: The Judicial
Doctrine of Claim ofRight, 21 TAX L. REv. 263, 271 (1966).
34. See Webster, supra note 30, at 381. Webster also argues that the
deduction scheme attributed to North American Oil is not truly of Brandeis's
making, rather one of mistaken judicial interpretation. Id. at 384-85 (noting
also that Justice Douglas argued in his dissenting opinion in United States v.
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951), that "an adjustment to the original year of receipt
would be proper").
35. Id. at 384; see also Jane Hendershott, Restoration-Claim of Right-
One Aspect of Section 1341, 48 TAXES 585, 585 (1970).
36. 345 U.S. 278 (1953).
37. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. at 681.
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In some cases, this treatment will benefit the taxpayer; in
others it will not. Factors such as the tax rates in the years
involved and the brackets in which the income of the
taxpayer falls will be controlling. A rule which required that
the adjustment be made in the earlier year of receipt instead
of the later year of repayment would generally be
unfavorable to taxpayers, for the statute of limitations
would frequently bar any adjustment of the tax liability for
the earlier year. Congress has enacted an annual accounting
system under which income is counted up at the end of each
year. It would be disruptive of an orderly collection of the
revenue to rule that the accounting must be done over again
to reflect events occurring after the year for which the
accounting is made, and would violate the spirit of the
annual accounting system. This basic principle cannot be
changed simply because it is of advantage to a taxpayer or
to the Government in a particular case that a different rule
be followed.38
The controversy surrounding North American Oil and its
progeny came to a head in United States v. Lewis.39 In Lewis, the
taxpayer received a cash bonus in 1944, the amount of which was in
error. 0 Lewis reported the full amount as income in 1944, before the
IRS notified him of the error, and repaid half the amount in 1946.41
The Supreme Court held that Lewis could not reopen his 1944
income tax return to reflect the repayment, forcing him to deduct the
repayment amount in 1946 and suffer a loss because the repaid
income put him in a higher tax bracket in 1944. 
42
In 1954, Congress enacted § 1341, largely in response to
Lewis.4 3 Under the newly crafted statutory scheme, a taxpayer who
received income under a claim of right, paid taxes on that money,
and subsequently repaid the income as required, would be able to
deduct that income against the taxable income in the repayment year
38. Healy, 345 U.S. at 284-85 (footnote omitted).
39. 340U.S. 590 (1951).
40. Patricia D. White, Realization, Recognition, Reconciliation, Rationality
and the Structure of the Federal Tax System, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2034, 2059
(1990).
41. Id.; see also DuBroff, supra note 30, at 736.
42. White, supra note 40, at 2059.
43. Id.
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as provided under the common law.44 In contrast to the common
law, however, § 1341 also allowed the taxpayer to recalculate his tax
liability for the years in which the government originally taxed the
repaid income.45 In fact, under the federal scheme, the government
requires the taxpayer to elect the more favorable of the two
calculation methods.46 Subsection (a)(3) clearly indicates that where
the amount of such item exceeds $3,000, the "tax imposed shall be
the lesser of' either subdivision (4) or subdivision (5).47
Accordingly, Congress ultimately designed § 1341 to restore the
taxpayer to substantially the same position he would have been in
had he not received the erroneous income in the first place.48
B. California 's Claim of Right Doctrine
Prior to the congressional enactment of I.R.C. § 1341, California
adhered to the common law principles formulated in North American
44. Justice Marshall noted in Skelly Oil that "it is clear that Congress did
not intend to tamper with the underlying claim-of-right doctrine; it only
provided an alternative for certain cases in which the new approach favored the
taxpayer." 394 U.S. at 682.
45. Section 1341(a) provides, specifically that: If,
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or
years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right
to such an item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was
established after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the
taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion
of such item; and
(3) the amount of such item exceeds $3,000, then the tax imposed by
this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the following:
(4) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction; or
(5) an amount equal to-
(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction,
minus
(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the corresponding
provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or
years) which would result solely from the exclusion of such item
(or portion thereof) from gross income for such prior taxable year
(or years).
26 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004) (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., Dept. of Revenue v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 480 So. 2d
1349, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
47. 26 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004).
48. See id.
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Oil. An early reference is in a 1942 State Board of Equalization
(SBE) ruling.49 After Congress passed § 1341 in 1954, California's
Revenue and Taxation Code did not incorporate the federal model
nor did it create any state analog. In a 1959 case, In the Matter of the
Appeal of Mae M. Oury,50 the SBE again referenced North American
Oil and noted that "[t]he principle thus stated has since been
consistently applied by the courts where monies are in dispute."
51
In a string of cases from 1966 through 1976, the SBE
consistently held that there was no California analog to § 1341 and
that relief under the federal scheme was not available to California
taxpayers. 52 However, as the plaintiff in Ackerman noted, California
attempted through legislative effort in 1983 to simplify the state's
Revenue and Taxation Code and harmonize it, as best it could, with
the Federal Internal Revenue Code.53 In fact, the 1983 amendment
to the Code provides, through Revenue and Taxation Code §
17024.5, that "[r]eferences to 'adjusted gross income' shall mean the
amount computed in accordance with § 17072, except as provided in
paragraph (2)." 4 Paragraph (2) states that "[r]eferences to 'adjusted
gross income' for purposes of computing limitations based upon
adjusted gross income, shall mean the amount required to be shown
as adjusted gross income on the federal tax return for the same
49. In re Appeal of Cent. Indus. Loan Co., 1942 Cal. Tax LEXIS 6 (State
Board of Equalization Dec. 2, 1942). In re Appeal of Central Industrial Loan,
Co., involved the collection of "service charges" related to loans which were
found to be excessive and by consent decree were credited to the principles on
the loans. Id. at *2-*3. The case's taxpayer then amended his previous return
to reflect the change in income. The court, however, distinguished accrual
basis accounting from cash accounting in determining that the service charges
were not reportable income. Id. at *5-*6.
50. 1959 Cal. Tax LEXIS 47 (State Board of Equalization Feb. 17, 1959)
(holding that income held in trust pending a judicial approval of the terms of
compensation provided for trustees was income in the year of disbursement/
receipt and thus liable for taxation).
51. Id. at *4.
52. See In re Vertullo, 1976 Cal. Tax LEXIS 45, at *6 (Cal. State Bd. of
Equalization July 26,1976); In re the Appeal of Parker, 1969 Cal. Tax LEXIS
34, at *8 (Feb. 26, 1969); In re Appeal of Kirsch, 1967 Cal. Tax LEXIS 16, at
*3 (Oct. 3, 1967); In re Appeal of Lovering, 1966 Cal. Tax LEXIS 63, at *6
(Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Apr. 21, 1966).
53. See Ackerman v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. BC 296334, at 12 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Aug. 17, 2004).
54. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 17024.5(h)(1) (Deering 2004).
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taxable year."
55
The legislative history of the 1983 Conformity Act reveals that
when supporters introduced the bill to the Assembly on December 6,
1982, it included a Chapter 15 entitled "Readjustment of Tax
Between Years. '56  Under that chapter, the tax code included an
amendment to § 18241, which read, "The readjustment of tax
between years shall be determined in accordance with Subchapter Q
of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, except as
otherwise provided in this chapter."
57
This provision clearly would have incorporated § 1341, which
resides under Part V of Subchapter Q.58 This language, however, did
not survive even the first amendment to the bill as it passed through
the California Assembly and Senate. In fact, legislators completely
repealed Chapter 15 and § 18241 in the first amended draft.59 It is
noteworthy, however, that prior to 1983 (and at no time subsequent)
Chapter 15 did not include a claim of right provision.
60
Legislative intent cannot be easily adduced from these facts
alone. While the bill as initially proposed in 1983 would have
directly incorporated § 1341 by way of subsection Q, it is unclear
from the statutory language if legislators intended to incorporate
subsection Q generally through Revenue and Taxation Code §
17024.5. It also is unclear whether the proposed amendments to
Chapter 15 were originally intended to craft exceptions to the
broader incorporation. Arguably, when the Legislature repealed
55. Id. § 17024.5(h)(2).
56. Assemb. B. 36, 1983-84 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1982).
57. Id.
58. See 26 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004).
59. Assemb. B. 36, 1983 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1983). As amended, section
66 reads: "Chapter 15 (commencing with section 18241) of part 10 of Di-
vision 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code is repealed."
60. In fact, the latest amendment to Chapter 15 prior to the 1983 repeal was
1971 and covered only "income averaging" as re-adjustment of taxes between
years. Section 18241 of the Revenue and Taxation Code was amended to read:
If an eligible individual has averageable [(sic)] income for the
computation year, and if the amount of such income exceeds three
thousand dollars ($3,000), then the tax imposed by Section 17041 for
the computation year which is attributable to averageable income
shall be five times the increase in tax under such section which would
result from adding 20 percent of such income to 133 1/3 percent of
average base period income.
1971 Cal. Stat. 120.1.
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Chapter 15 in its entirety, it may well have intended to yield this title,
"Readjustment of Tax Between Years," to the federal code.
Even absent direct incorporation, which would have occurred
had the original Chapter 15 language survived, § 1341 may have
been incorporated into the Revenue and Taxation Code by reference.
Part IV of this Comment, more closely examines other provisions
within the 1983 Conformity Act through which § 1341 may have
been incorporated.
If the statutory scheme is unclear on the issue of incorporation,
case law (through determinations by the SBE) on the matter is no
more availing. Since 1983, only two cases appear to have been
litigated under the banner of § 1341. The first, In re Agnew,
6 1
involved an attempt by the former Vice President of the United
States to recover taxes paid on monies paid to him as bribes while
holding state office in Maryland.62 The court noted that "[w]ithout
citation to any state authority, appellant seeks to draw on the equi-
table principles underlying the federal claim of right doctrine...."63
But, the Agnew court did not compelled to investigate further
and stated, "[i]t would hardly be 'equitable' for the taxpayers of
California.. .to foot the bill for part of appellant's liability to the
taxpayers of Maryland for bribes received while he was a resident
and elected official of that state."'64 Thus, the issue remained
unsettled.
In 2002, § 1341 made another brief appearance in Ambrosselli,
65
where the SBE wrote that "California generally follows federal law
on the 'claim of right doctrine."' 66 What "generally" means is not
clear, and this cryptic proclamation can easily be construed to mean
that in the SBE's view, the 1983 Conformity Act incorporated
61. No. 87R-0521-SS, 1989 Cal. Tax LEXIS 10 (Cal. State Bd. of
Equalization Apr. 6, 1989).
62. Id. at *1-*2.
63. Id. at *6.
64. Id.
65. Ambrosselli v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. 27,108, 2002 Cal. Tax LEXIS
45 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Feb. 6, 2002). This case involved insurance
fraud whereby various works of art were claimed to have been stolen from
Appellant's home. The money paid on the claim was not reported as income
and ultimately paid back after the fraud was discovered. The court held that
the money was taxable income under the claim of right doctrine, but that it was
not deductible in the year of restitution. Id. at *3-*4.
66. Id. at *3 (internal quotations omitted).
2285December 2005]
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§ 1341 into the Revenue and Taxation Code.67 On the other hand, as
the Ackerman court points out, "Ambrosselli ... is by no means a
clear articulation that the state has explicitly adopted 1341, either in
part or in full."' 68 Ackerman thus stands before the California Court
of Appeals as a case of first impression on this issue.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Ackerman court ultimately concluded that California's
Revenue and Taxation Code did not incorporate § 1341 .69 The court
premised this conclusion largely on the fact that the Revenue and
Taxation Code does not explicitly provide that the federal scheme be
adopted.7 °
The court accepted the FTB's arguments that there is no express
language incorporating § 1341 into the Revenue and Taxation Code
and that incorporation by reference, as argued by Ackerman, fails
because the Revenue and Taxation Code specifically prohibits the
application of "Federal Tax Credits."71 The court also took judicial
notice of Assembly Bill 3072 (AB 3072), pending legislation that
seeks to clarify California's claim of right provisions by expressly
adopting § 1341.72
While AB 3072 appears to bolster the FTB's argument that §
1341 has not been incorporated into the Revenue and Taxation
Code, 73 some degree of scrutiny is appropriate when viewing this
particular piece of pending legislation. Supporters introduced the bill
to the State Assembly on March 11, 2003, 74 just two months before
Ackerman filed his complaint (and after significant correspondence
between Ackerman's tax attorneys and the FTB regarding the
67. In Ambrosselli, the issue, however, was moot because under both the
common law and federal claim of right provisions, the repayment is not
deductible when made "in lieu of incarceration or primarily to further
rehabilitation." Id.
68. Ackerman v. Franchise Tax Bc., No. BC 296334, at 13 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 17, 2004).
69. Id. at 14.
70. Id. at 15 (commenting that "[i]f it is the Legislature's intent that I.R.C.
§ 1341 be adopted in full, it should do so directly and unambiguously").
71. Id. at 11.
72. Assemb. B. 3072, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (proposed Mar.
11,2004).
73. Bill Analysis, supra note 28.
74. Id.
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matter.)75 The FTB itself sponsored the bill and the Bill Analysis
states that its purpose is "to clarify tax law and ease taxpayer
compliance and administrative burdens regarding claim of right
provisions."
76
Even though the pending legislation states that § 1341 has not
been incorporated into the Revenue and Taxation Code, this does not
make it so. This statement is merely the opinion of the bill's drafter
and lacks sufficient evidence to compel the court to find that § 1341
has not been incorporated. The legislative record does not contain
indisputable evidence that when the legislature repealed chapter 15
in full, California sought to maintain the common law approach to
the claim of right doctrine over the incorporation of § 1341. AB
3072 might be more properly viewed as "clarifying" the state's
position that it should follow the federal claim of right approach,
rather than establishing the fact that the state does not follow the
federal approach.
Ackerman argued that § 1341 had been incorporated into the
Revenue and Taxation Code generally by the 1983 Conformity Act,
either directly or alternatively by reference. 77 The trial court first
analyzed incorporation by reference from the plaintiffs position that
the "substantial cross reference" to § 1341 in I.R.C. § 67 incorpo-
rated the federal provision.78  This argument proved ultimately
fatal. 79 Section 67 merely places a two percent floor on miscella-
neous itemized deductions, requiring the aggregate of such
deductions to exceed the taxpayer's adjusted gross income 80 The
reference to § 1341 relates to its exclusion as an itemized de-
duction.81 Thus, Ackerman's argument that § 1341 passes through to
Revenue and Taxation Code § 17076, which incorporates the two
75. See Ackerman, No. BC 296334, at 9.
76. Bill Analysis, supra note 28, at 3.
77. See Ackerman, No. BC 296334, at 11.
78. Id.
79. The trial court did not separately analyze the issue of incorporation by
reference using § 67, but rather concluded that even if such incorporation could
be found, it would be stripped of any value because Revenue & Taxation Code
§ 17024.5 prohibits applying federal tax credits. See id. at 11-12. The issue of
whether or not § 1341(a)(5) constitutes a federal tax credit is discussed below.
See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
80. 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2004).
81. Id. § 67(b)(9).
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percent floor from the federal scheme, fails by simple logic.
Section 1341, however, has its own internal cross-references to
other parts of the I.R.C. through which it can easily be seen to have
been incorporated into the Revenue and Taxation Code. In 1983, the
legislature amended Revenue and Taxation Code § 17201 to
incorporate Part VI of Subchapter B of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the
I.R.C., except as otherwise provided by the code. 82 Under Part VI,
"Itemized Deductions for Individuals and Corporations," § 172
covers net operating loss deductions. 83 Subsection (b)(5) of § 1341
reads:
For purposes of this chapter, the net operating loss
described in paragraph (4)(A) of this subsection, or the net
operating loss or capital loss described in paragraph (4)(B)
of this subsection, as the case may be, shall (after the
application of paragraph (4) or (5)(B) of subsection (a) for
the taxable year) be taken into account under section
172.. 84
Thus, a carryover or carryback that a taxpayer achieves through
operation of § 1341 becomes a carryover or carryback under § 172.
Since § 172 of the I.R.C. has been incorporated into the California
code by operation of Revenue and Taxation Code § 17201, it
logically follows that § 1341 has been incorporated by reference as a
result of its cross-reference with Part VI of Subchapter B of Chapter
1 of Subtitle A of the I.R.C.
The FTB argued, alternatively, that even if such an
incorporation by reference existed, § 17024.5 of the Revenue and
Taxation Code would prohibit it from applying § 1341, subsection
(a)(5) because that alternative calculation method creates what
amounts to a federal tax credit.
8 5
82. 1983 Cal. Stat. 488.
83. Subsection (a), "DEDUCTION ALLOWED," states,
There shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year an amount
equal to the aggregate of (1) the net operating loss carryovers to such
year, plus (2) the net operating loss carrybacks to such year. For
purposes of this subtitle, the term "net operating loss deduction"
means the deduction allowed by this subsection.
26 U.S.C. § 172(a).
84. Id. § 1341 (emphasis added).
85. Ackerman v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. BC 296334, at 11 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 17, 2004).
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma faced a similar situation in
Dugger v. Oklahoma.86 Athel W. and Anna Dugger received income
totaling $426,567.00 from the sale of gas from 1984 through 
1986.87
The Duggers subsequently repaid $365,204.29 in 1987.88 The
Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC) argued that § 1341(a)(5) created
"a federal tax credit, which is not incorporated into our state income
tax laws by virtue of our 'piggy-back' system, and that the state
income tax code does not have a parallel credit.
'"8 9
The court noted that the "OTC does not cite any federal
authority establishing § 1341 as a tax credit statute and our research
has revealed none." 90  It then remanded the case to determine
whether the Duggers' federal income tax had been calculated under §
1341(a)(4) or (a)(5). 91
Applying this judicial interpretation of the term "credit" found
in subsection (a)(5), the FTB's argument that § 1341 can only have
been partially incorporated, if at all, fails. Removing this obstacle, it
becomes possible that § 1341 may have been incorporated in its
entirety through Revenue and Taxation Code § 17201. The infer-
ential steps in reaching such a conclusion are relatively simple and
do not offend any traditional approach to statutory construction. As
the Ackerman court notes, "[the] court is charged to enforce 'the
apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather
than defeating the general purpose of the statute.' ' 92 Indeed, the
court "wherever possible ... 'will interpret a statute as consistent
with applicable constitutional provisions, seeking to harmonize
Constitution and statute."'
93
The general purpose of § 17201 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code was to incorporate, with enumerated exceptions, Part VI of
86. 834 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1992).
87. Id. at 965.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 967 n.6.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 969.
92. Ackerman v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. BC 296334, at 8 (Cal Super Ct.
Aug. 17, 2004) (citing Fujitsu IT Holdings v. Franchise Tax Bd., 120 Cal. App.
4th 459, 480 (2004)).
93. Fujitsu IT Holdings, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 480 (citing People v. Super.
Ct., 23 Cal. 4th 183, 193 (2000)).
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Subchapter B of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the I.R.C. 94 There is no
specific, enumerated exception in the Revenue and Taxation Code
indicating that § 1341 may not be applied as a carryover or carryback
pursuant to § 172 as provided in the I.R.C. Furthermore, such a
construction satisfies the goal that the statute be consistent with
applicable constitutional provisions. As discussed below, there is a
strong argument that the deduction-only approach adopted for by the
FTB may violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
V. TAXES AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The Ackerman court held that California's adherence to the
common law claim of right doctrine did not violate the constitutional
principles found in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV of the United States Constitution.95 The court concluded that
California's approach does not discriminate against out-of-state
citizens. It noted that, with the exception of the state source income
problem for non-residents, the common law doctrine is equally
onerous on in-state residents when the income repaid is greater than
the income received in the repayment year.96
The court's conclusion that the state's application of North
94. See 1983 Cal. Stat. 488, § 29.
95. Ackerman, No. BC 296334, at 15-17.
96. Id. at 16. Even though the trial court concluded that there was no
discrimination, it analyzed the California scheme under a traditional substantial
relationship test. The court cited Davis v. Franchise Tax Board, 139 Cal. Rptr.
797 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977), in which the taxpayer challenged a Revenue &
Taxation Code provision on income-averaging as violating the Privileges and
Immunities Clause because he was unable to take advantage of the provision as
a non-resident. The case involved a taxpayer who had lived in California for a
number of years and then moved to Nevada. The taxpayer sought to income-
average three years of California income with one year of Nevada income, but
was not allowed to do so because the statute requires the income averaged to
include four "base years" in addition to the current tax year and Davis could
not meet the base year requirement. The Davis court found that the dis-
criminatory policy bore a substantial relationship to "the state's general policy
of ignoring out-of-state income as a factor in progressive taxation." Id. at 799.
The Ackerman court found the situation in Davis to be similar enough to
follow its guidance, noting that "an occasional or accidental inequality due to
circumstances personal to the taxpayer will not invalidate a nondiscriminatory
general rule." Ackerman, No. BC 296334, at 16-17 (quoting Davis, 139 Cal.
Rpt. at 800 (citing Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 80-81
(1920))).
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American Oil does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
however, does not automatically make the state's claim of right
scheme constitutional. When the state, either directly or through a
regulatory mechanism, confiscates a citizen's real or personal
property without compensation, the action may implicate97 the
Takings Clause.
98
"Takings" challenges in the tax realm are infrequent and
consistently defeated. 99 This is largely the result of the nature of the
challenges and the underlying constitutional power to lay and collect
taxes found in Article 1, section 8, Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution °° and in the Sixteenth Amendment.' 0' One takings
argument is that the imposition of any tax violates the Fifth
Amendment. One example is Coleman v. Commissioner,102 where
the taxpayer did not file returns for three years (after having
previously filed timely returns) arguing that "wages are not
income."'0 3  The IRS assessed taxes and penalties and Coleman
sought review. Coleman argued that the income tax is a taking and
violated his right to earn income, and thus was contrary to the Fifth
Amendment. °4 The Seventh Circuit summarized the weaknesses of
the argument by pointing out the constitutional basis for laying and
collecting taxes found in Article 1, § 8, Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution and the Sixteenth Amendment.
10 5
The same textual arguments have been used to assert that the
97. See ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 121-25 (3d ed. 2004).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99. A handful of cases are discussed below, each revealing an unwilling-
ness by the courts to find a taking where taxes are concerned. See infra notes
102-115 and accompanying text.
100. The Tax Clause provides that: "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
101. The Sixteenth Amendment specifically provides that: "[t]he Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard
to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
102. 791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 70.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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government's failure to pay interest on taxes withheld but later
refunded constitutes a taking. In 1974, Jacobs v. Gromatsky
presented this precise issue to the Fifth Circuit. 0 6  The court
announced that the Sixteenth Amendment provided Congress the
power to "lay and collect taxes" including the power to "prescrib[e]
the basic rates of taxation, the time and manner in which taxes are to
be paid; [and] also ... the means and methods for making refunds-
with our without interest, which must be viewed realistically as no
more than one function of the overall rate of such exaction."
07
In 1998, however, the United States Supreme Court in Phillips
v. Washington Legal Foundation10 8 concluded that interest earned on
principle constitutes "private property" for purposes of the Takings
Clause, 1 9 a move that some believe "may have encouraged Takings
Clause challenges to the tax withholding system.""10  The case
involved a statute requiring attorneys to place client funds that could
not generate positive interest earnings into "Interest on Lawyers
Trust Account" (IOLTA)." l The statute required that the interest
from the pooled IOLTA accounts be paid to the Texas Equal Access
to Justice Foundation." 12 The court held that the interest was the
property of the client for whom the money was held in trust, but
remanded the case for further proceedings. 113  More recently,
however, the Court decided Brown v. Legal Foundation of
Washington" 14 and found, on similar facts, that although the statutory
scheme requiring the IOLTA interest be paid to the Legal Foundation
of Washington was a per se taking, it was not unconstitutional
because it did not violate the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."
5
While not dealing specifically with tax withholding or refunds,
these cases make it clear that money is personal property and that
106. 494 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1974).
107. Id. at514.
108. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
109. Id. at 172 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110. Jeremy R. Polk, Compensation for the Fruit of the Fund's Use: The
Takings Clause and Tax Refunds, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 657, 657 (2004).
111. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 159-62.
112. Id. at 162.
113. Id. at 172 (Souter, J., dissenting).
114. 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
115. Id. at 236-37, 240.
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"[i]n the context of personal property, the government's seizure or
confiscation of the property is the equivalent of a physical
invasion."'1"6 In drawing a comparison between IOLTA accounts and
interest earned on withheld income tax, the interest earned on the
withheld tax may not be negligible depending on the amount of taxes
withheld. Unlike IOLTA plans, where attorneys place the principle
in the account only when it cannot generate sufficient interest on its
own, IRS withholding has no such procedural safeguard. Absent the
invocation of the Sixteenth Amendment, Brown indicates that a
taking may occur where the interest generated on withholdings is not
insignificant.
In light of this shift in jurisprudence, the salient question
becomes whether the constitutional anchors of the Tax Clause and
the Sixteenth Amendment protect a taxpayer's money from
withholdings by the IRS. In Van Sant v. United States,"l 7 a district
court concluded that "Congress' constitutional power to institute and
operate an income tax disposes of plaintiffs takings claim even if it
is true that the ... tax withholding was wrongful."'1" In contrast, in
Washton v. United States,"19 the court considered sua sponte the
possibility that "the disallowance of a refund owed by the IRS
pursuant to statute violated the just compensation clause of the Fifth
Amendment."' 120 The issue remains unresolved, 12 1 but there is some
indication that the government's "failure to refund overpayments of
income taxes may implicate the Takings Clause."'
122
California's claim of right scheme, "as applied" in this case,
provides a rare example of how withheld taxes constitute a taking
because a court cannot rationally construe the regulatory mechanism
behind the taking as necessary for the "means and method for the
116. IDES & MAY, supra note 98, at 125.
117. No. 97-363, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21871 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 2001).
118. Id. at * 19-*20.
119. No. 2:91CV00121, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2863 (D. Conn. Feb. 12,
1993).
120. Id. at *12 n.2.
121. See id. (stating that: "[a] review of the parties [sic] briefs, however,
proved inconclusive. Because it could not locate any relevant case law on the
issue and because the submissions of both parties provided the court with little
guidance on the issue, the court believes it best to leave this issue for another
day").
122. Polk, supra note 110, at 664.
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making of refunds."' 23 Nor can the court consider a fair function of
the exaction, as the Gromatsky court found the interest earned on
withheld taxes to be. 124 The State tax received on income that is held
under a claim of right and later found to be erroneously received (and
subsequently repaid) is not inconsequential. Simply put, once the
taxpayer repays the restricted income (in full, with no deductions
made accounting for the taxes already paid on that income), the tax
imposed on that money, which is no longer income, no longer falls
within the protection of the state's power to lay and collect taxes on
income. The federal government understood this and enacted §
1341. The State of California, however, by virtue of the decision in
Ackerman, has been granted the extraordinary power to lay and
collect tax on "non-income."
VI. CONCLUSION
The harm Peter Ackerman suffered as a result of the FTB's
refusal to accept his refund calculations based on § 1341 is both real
and substantial. While it may be tempting to allow the legislature to
fix the problem through a confusing scheme of adopting portions of
the I.R.C. and repealing sections of the Revenue and Taxation Code,
such future corrective measures will not make Peter Ackerman
whole. Nor are such measures guaranteed. As illustrated in the
introduction, there are real and significant implications for the
average taxpayer.
In today's global economy, we are beginning to see significant
alterations to traditional employment models.' 25  The modem
workforce is increasingly mobile 126 and technologically savvy-
123. See Jacobs v. Gromatsky, 494 F.2d 513, 514 (5th Cir. 1974).
124. See generally id. (discussing that the power to withhold taxes without
paying interest vests in Congress with the Sixteenth Amendment right to lay
and collect income taxes); supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
125. See Jonathan Weisman, Permanent Job Proves an Elusive Dream, THE
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at Al (noting that "[i]n a single generation,
'contingent employment arrangements' have begun to transform the world of
work, not only for temp workers, but also for those in traditional jobs who are
competing with a tier of employees receiving lower pay and few, if any,
benefits").
126. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, forty-three million Americans
moved residences between 1999 and 2000. Of those "migratory" Americans,
nearly 20 percent moved between states. Of those 8.6 million Americans who
moved interstate in that year, 31 percent stated the reason for their relocation
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capable of working remotely via the Internet' 27 and generating
income from multiple sources (including multiple states). Over the
128
past several years, there has been a steady rise in contract workers.
Offshoring is another factor that, in recent years, has resulted in
significant job losses 29 that may contribute to individual migration
out of the state and a shift in the traditional employment model (such
as contingent and contract workers). In California, small businesses
seeking to remain viable complain that the hostile business
environment forces them to leave the state in order to take advantage
of more favorable economic conditions in other states or countries.'
30
In this rapidly changing economic climate, the common law
scheme may be losing relevance and, as demonstrated in Ackerman,
has proven to be a burden on the taxpayer. The anecdotal evidence
cited above and the paucity of SBE rulings dealing with the
application of § 1341 to California personal income tax returns
suggest that applying § 1341 calculations to state tax returns may not
have been an issue with the FTB until it received a claim for an
extremely large refund amount. Additionally, the timing of the
as being work related. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2000, http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/ 20 00/
Chap03.pdf (last visited Mar. 03, 2005).
127. A recent survey shows that over forty-four million Americans worked
from home in 2004, a 7.5 percent jump from 2003. See Press Release, Int'l
Telework Ass'n & Counsel, Work at Home Grows in Past Year by 7.5% in
U.S. Use of Broadband for Work at Home Grows by 84%, available at
http://www.workingfromanywhere.org/news/pr090204.htm (last visited Sept.
15, 2005).
128. See Victor Godinez, Self-Employed, Freelance Workers on the Rise in
New Job Market, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/ 200 1809467_free
lance07.html.
129. The issue of offshoring was a consistent theme in the 2004 Presidential
elections. Senator Kerry, the Democratic candidate, pointedly accused the
Bush Administration of "deliver[ing] a double blow to America's workers, 3
million jobs destroyed on their watch, and now they want to export more of our
jobs overseas ... What in the world were they thinking?" Jonathan Weisman,
Bush, Advisor Assailed for Stance on "Offshoring" Jobs, WASH. POST, Feb.
11, 2004, at A06. The California legislature in August 2004 passed AB 1829,
designed to prevent the loss of more California jobs to foreign competitors.
Jordon Rau, Offshore Jobs Bill Is OKd, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 2004, at B 1.
130. See, e.g., Peronet Despeignes, Exodus Shows California Not Golden for
All, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2003-08-25-golden-state-exodusx.htm.
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proposed legislation, the fact that the FTB sponsored it and drafters
used language tailor made for the FTB's argument make the bill
somewhat suspicious. As demonstrated above, there is ample
evidence that § 1341 has already been incorporated into the Revenue
and Taxation Code by reference, through the operation of Revenue
and Taxation Code § 17201 and its incorporation of I.R.C. § 172.
There is also a compelling argument that the California common law
approach as applied in this case violates the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
The California claim of right scheme is hostile to the
fundamental principles of economic freedom upon which both the
United States and California constitutions are founded. Few would
argue that the state has the power to lay and collect taxes from its
citizens. But the idea that the state can take money that clearly
belongs to its citizens offends our most basic democratic ideals.
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